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5 DOE Officials Under Hill Fire Trade Back-Pats

In an earlier column I identified five senior Energy Department officials who were criticized by congressional investigators for allowing shocking lapses of security at government plants that produce weapons-grade nuclear material.

In what Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) called a "curious" system of rewards and punishment, the five officials were given achievement medals and substantial bonuses despite accusations of mismanagement.

Now my associates Indy Badhwar and Tony Capaccio have obtained internal DOE documents which show that some of the bonus babies wrote the glowing recommendations that earned their colleagues the financial awards.

Dingell's year-long investigation concluded that the five officials not only were responsible for lax security that left nuclear plants vulnerable to terrorist attacks, but deliberately misled Congress and the White House on the lapses. Yet during the three-year period of alleged mismanagement the accused officials pocketed \$115,000 in awards.

In a pitiful attempt to cover up

the congressional criticism, Len Kojm, a DOE congressional liaison official, tried to use his own stamp and ink pad to put a spurious "Secret" label on a letter from Dingell that spelled out the transgressions of the agency officials.

Here's a rundown on the bonus babies:

• Herman Roser, assistant DOE secretary for defense programs, collected more than \$35,000 in bonuses. Based on Roser's testimony at a closed hearing on Sept. 10, 1982, and other meetings, Dingell concluded that the official had not only misled the subcommittee but had managed to kill a highly critical security assessment undertaken by independent anti-terrorist experts.

But on Sept. 16, 1982, in a recommendation for an \$11,115 bonus, Energy Secretary Donald P. Hodel cited Roser's "exceptional" service and his "strengths in communicating and negotiating with members of Congress."

Troy Wade, principal deputy assistant secretary, won more than \$32,000 in merit awards. Roser commended Wade for having "far exceeded expectations of him," and praised him for ensuring that safeguards for DOE facilities received top priority.

Dingell concluded that Wade was Roser's "point man" in scuttling the embarrassing independent assessment program. • James Culpepper, deputy assistant secretary for security, earned more than \$20,000 in bonuses. Wade wrote that Culpepper had discharged his duties "in a highly proficient and diligent manner." Dingell pointed out that Culpepper was responsible for a report to the president that the General Accounting Office called "misleading."

• Ralph Caudle, director of the safeguards office, was given a silver medal and about \$15,000 in bonuses. Dingell wrote that at the Sept. 10 hearing and later, Caudle "continued to assure Congress that security was adequate." But Dingell added: "This was not true, and documents in his own files indicated that it was not true." Yet in a performance rating dated Sept. 8-16, 1982, Culpepper praised Caudle's skill at "intra-agency and congressional interface" and in conveying "a message of safeguards and security."

• Robert Morgan, former manager of the Savannah River, S.C., nuclear plant, topped \$26,000 in cash awards. Dingell found that Morgan had "misled the subcommittee about the status of safeguards at Savannah." In a recommendation dated Sept. 8, 1982, Roser said Morgan "has established effective contact... with members of Congress to ensure that they are well informed

FRENCH LEADERS...Continued

Noting that Europe is the only part of the world where the armies of the two superpowers are in direct contact, he added: "There can be no European defense as long as there is no solution to the German problem."

French attitudes toward military cooperation with its allies have undergone a change since Mitterrand's election in May 1981. One of his first acts was to reactivate a clause in the 1963 Franco-German treaty allowing for joint military consultation. He has also struck a more forthrightly Atlanticist tone than his predecessor, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, by publicly endorsing the deployment of American cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.

At the military rather than political level, Mitterrand's Socialist government has unveiled plans for a "rapid-action force" of 47,000 men that could be deployed in forward positions in West Ger-

many in the event of war. French officials insist that the decision on whether to use the force would be taken in Paris, even though Defense Minister Charles Hernu has acknowledged that there will have to be prior coordination with the allies on logistics and aerial support.

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Visionary rhetoric aside, in the short term Mitterrand is directing his efforts to preserving the security link between the United States and Western Europe, which he says the Soviet Union is out to break. This fear of "decoupling" explains why he has come out so strongly in favor of the deployment of American Euromissiles to counter the buildup of Soviet SS20s targeted on Western Europe.

While conjuring up an image of Europeans eventually assuming responsibility for their own defense, Mitterrand has always been careful to add that Europe's security will not be built up through the destruction of the present Atlantic Alliance.

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